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This paper describes the theory and considerations in the application of metrics to 
measure the effectiveness of fault management. Fault management refers here to the 
operational aspect of system health management, and as such is considered as a meta-control 
loop that operates to preserve or maximize the system’s ability to achieve its goals in the face 
of current or prospective failure. As a suite of control loops, the metrics to estimate and 
measure the effectiveness of fault management are similar to those of classical control loops 
in being divided into two major classes: state estimation, and state control. State estimation 
metrics can be classified into lower-level subdivisions for detection coverage, detection 
effectiveness, fault isolation and fault identification (diagnostics), and failure prognosis. State 
control metrics can be classified into response determination effectiveness and response 
effectiveness. These metrics are applied to each and every fault management control loop in 
the system, for each failure to which they apply, and probabilistically summed to determine 
the effectiveness of these fault management control loops to preserve the relevant system 
goals that they are intended to protect. 
I. Introduction 
AULT Fault Management (FM) is the operational aspect of System Health Management (SHM), which in turn 
is defined as “the capabilities of a system that preserve the system’s ability to function as intended”.1 
Alternatively, SHM can be defined as the capabilities of a system that preserve the system’s ability to achieve its 
goals. Fault Management consists of the non-passive aspects of these capabilities that detect and respond to 
projected or existing failure within the system. These detection and response capabilities function as “meta-control 
loops” that determine if the system’s nominal control functions are operating properly, and if not, to place the 
system into a state that is once again controllable. This state could be controlled either to existing or degraded 
system goals.2 
Historically, one of the major difficulties in designing FM has been measuring or determining the value of 
differing FM designs. To date, the vast majority of FM design has been performed on an ad hoc basis, with some use 
of qualitative requirements such as single failure tolerance, assessed against a suite of failure modes provided in 
failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA). Quantitative estimates of the value of FM have occasionally been 
performed on an ad hoc basis to assess specific design options. 
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As in any other engineering design, FM design should be based on knowledge of the value it provides. Since for 
a given system there could be a variety of potential FM designs, how does a designer choose which is best? When 
has enough FM been put into the system? How much is “too much”? 
Given that FM functions as a suite of control loops, heretofore called “Fault Management Control Loops” 
(FMCL), the question of value for FM boils down to the question of how much value each possible FMCL provides, 
and collectively, how much they cumulatively provide for the system. Having quantitative measures of this value is 
preferable so as to enable trade studies of different design options. Quantitative measurement or estimate of value 
implies the need for metrics. 
This paper provides an overview of FM metrics, based on the above-noted theory that FM operates as meta-
control loops. Given this theory, this paper proposes and demonstrates that the value of FM can be measured 
quantitatively in a manner similar to, but extended beyond the measures used to assess the value of classical 
feedback control systems. 
II. Extending Control Theory 
The idea that FM is an extension of control theory implies that the key FM metrics are divided into metrics for 
state estimation (detection, prognostics, and diagnostics—isolation and identification), and for control (response 
decision, and response action).3 These two general categories of state estimation and control relate directly to two 
distinct categories of metrics: metrics for state estimation, and metrics for state control. These ultimately combine to 
form a single metric related to the probability of achieving the goal of the FMCL. That is, the probability of 
achieving the goal of the FMCL is the measure of how well the FMCL provides “goal insurance.” 
In general, the estimate per FMCL is a set of contingent probabilities, starting with the coverage estimates of 
detection capabilities. For those failures (and/or degradations and/or anomalies) that are detected, then the next step 
is to calculate the effectiveness of the detection. If this is successful, then the effectiveness of the diagnostic 
capabilities are assessed. For that fraction of successful diagnoses, the system’s ability to make the correct response 
decision is estimated. For that fraction for which the correct decision is made, then the response must be 
successfully performed, and its capability to do so estimated. This resulting contingent probability is the final value 
of the effectiveness of the total FMCL. 
State estimation metrics always relate to the probability of determining the “true” state of the system. These are 
often described in “truth tables” (or “confusion matrices”) typically represented as 2x2 matrices. The cells in the 
matrix relate the relationship between the true state and the estimate of the true state. For failure detection, these four 
relationships are listed and defined as follows, with respect to the determination as to whether a failure exists. 
1) True Positive (TP): A correct estimate that a failure exists, when it really does exist. 
2) True Negative (TN): A correct estimate that a failure does not exist, when it really does not exist. 
3) False Positive (FP): An incorrect estimate that a failure exists, when it really does not exist. 
4) False Negative (FN): An incorrect estimate that a failure does not exist, when it really does exist. 
Each of these four is estimated in probabilistic terms, and those estimates in turn have uncertainties associated 
with those probability estimates. State estimation functions are divided into three major types: detection, diagnostics, 
and prognostics. The FP/FN/TP/TN definitions differ slightly for diagnostics and prognostics, as compared to 
detection, which is defined above. 
State control metrics for decision and response are estimated based on their effectiveness in selecting and 
executing the proper response. As with control in general, these responses must execute in a timely manner before 
the associated system goal of the FMCL is compromised. The timeliness depends not only on the response, but on 
the physics of the failure effects that are being responded to, and the latencies of the entire FMCL, including the 
detection and diagnostic functions as well as the decision and response latencies. 
III. Failure Scenarios 
In general, any given FMCL detects and responds to a specific set of failure behaviors, which typically result 
from several or many failure modes. That is, many failure modes ultimately produce the same “intermediate failure 
effect” that is detected by the failure detection mechanism of an FMCL. While it is typical for FMEAs to define 
failure modes and then determine their effects on the system, from the perspective of FM, it is important to group 
failure modes by those common effects that are detected by a particular FMCL or group of FMCLs. For example, on 
a satellite one might have a failure detection that monitors the rotation rates of a vehicle. During attitude (rotation) 
maneuvers, the system expects certain rates to occur and will flag a failure if those rates go too high or too low. 
Let’s assume that the rates are too low. This could be because a thruster valve is stuck closed, because there is debris 
in a propellant line, or an isolation valve failed to a closed position. In turn, these problems could be caused by a 
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mechanical problem in a valve, a power failure to a valve, spurious commands to an isolation valve, or a host of 
other problems. However all of these problems are picked up by a single detection mechanism. To perform the 
calculation of detection effectiveness for the attitude rate detection “low”, one must group together all possible 
causes (failure modes) in all possible vehicle configurations and system modes and phases, as in some modes the 
failure may not be detectable, and in others it is easy to detect. To determine the value of the attitude rate detection 
and response which would be to switch to an alternate set of thrusters (the FMCL), one must also add up the 
probabilities of all of the failure modes that can cause the detection to occur, as the benefit of the detection is based 
on its ability to mitigate the set of failures that it can successfully detect and mitigate (respond to). 
As noted in this example, calculations of metrics for individual FMCLs requires consideration of major 
differences in failure behaviors and probabilities based on mission phases, modes and system configurations. 
Differing failure modes produce different system failure effects that are detected by different FMCLs. Furthermore, 
even for the same failure mode or group of failure modes that produce a given effect in one vehicle configuration, 
the end-effects can vary based on the system configuration and the external environment if it changes over time. 
To address these variations, the FM analyst must produce a global set of “failure scenarios”, each differentiated 
by the capability of the FMCLs to detect and respond, and to relevant system and environmental changes that alter 
the effectiveness of the FMCL. In general, because many failure modes produce the same failure effects at a higher 
level, and because these higher-level effects are what are detected and responded to by FMCLs, there are fewer 
failure scenarios than there are failure modes. For example, on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 
(NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) there are already over 16,000 identified failure modes, but overall these yield 
about 1,300 failure scenarios that can create loss of mission and hence cause threats to the safety of the crew. Each 
must be analyzed, though there are significant similarities among many of them, so that this analysis is further 
reduced to something over 100 failure cases that vary in results across mission phases. If the analysis is properly 
separated, the phase-dependent effects based on major changes to the external environment and system 
configuration can be analyzed separately, and then combined into the 100 specific cases. 
The FM analyst must specify all specific failure scenarios, and globally, define the entire suite of failure 
scenarios. Ideally, these are defined as a set of failure modes in a particular system configuration and mission phase 
and mode, which if not mitigated will compromise a relevant system goal. A comprehensive set of scenarios would 
encompass all failure modes across all relevant system configurations and mission phases/modes. For each defined 
scenario thus defined would be a set of FM metrics for the individual pieces of the FMCL, which are then combined 
in each FMCL as the product of contingent probabilities against relevant goals, and failures at teach step 
contributing to estimates that the goal is not met in that scenario. Finally, the estimates from all scenarios are 
summed, probabilistically weighted via the probability either of the failure modes, or of the scenario as a whole 
independent of the failure modes. 
IV. FM Metrics Theory and Description 
This section describes each of the major FM metrics in turn, from detection coverage, to detection effectiveness, 
to diagnostic and/or prognostic effectiveness, to response determination, to response effectiveness. These individual 
metrics are then combined to yield the effectiveness metrics for FMCLs, and from there, to the effectiveness of the 
FM for the system as a whole. 
A. Failure Detection Coverage 
The first major metric related to detection is coverage. A detection mechanism can be assessed for effectiveness 
only against those failures, degradations, or anomalies that it theoretically capable of detecting. If it cannot detect 
these behaviors, even in theory, then the detection has no “coverage” of those behaviors. Conversely, if behaviors 
are potentially detectable by the detection mechanism, then the mechanism “covers” them. 
Both failures and degradations relate to factors of “unacceptability”, whereas anomalies relate to 
“unexpectedness”. However, all of them ultimately relate to achievement of system goals. A more detailed 
discussion of the nature of goals the their relationship to failure and to failure detections can be found in Reference 
4.4 
Since coverage must be assessed against a goal, one must specify the goal against which the coverage metric is 
assessed. Once that is specified, then one can determine which failure modes whose failure effects can potentially 
compromise the achievement of that goal. Then, one identifies the detections available and can determine if they can 
collectively detect all of these failures. One can specify the fraction of failure modes whose effects can compromise 
the goal that are detected, divided by the total number of failure modes that can compromise the goal. This fraction 
is a simple coverage metric. To increase accuracy, one can then also define the probability of each failure mode 
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occurring, and generate a metric of the total amount of probability that can compromise the goal that is detected, 
divided by the total amount of probability that the goal can be compromised. This latter metric is the most useful as 
it is in a probabilistic form that will ultimately be needed. All undetected failure modes and their probabilities 
directly compromise the goal as no detection or response will occur. All detected failure modes and their 
probabilities are then passed along to the next step in state estimation calculations. 
One key nuance to the coverage estimate is deciding how to classify failure modes whose behaviors sometimes 
lead to failure and sometimes do not, or when those behaviors, even if they cause failure of some sub-function, do 
not always cause higher level function failures. This issue helps make clear why it is important to define the goal 
against which one estimates coverage, as it helps clarify what behaviors “matter” and what behaviors do not. It may 
be necessary to subdivide the probabilities into covered and non-covered fractions for some failure modes. 
Coverage for detection of degradation is estimated in the same way as coverage for failure detection, as 
degradation detection is performed against the same state variables and the same goals as failure, but with tighter 
threshold limits. For degradation, thresholds are set closer to “ideal” operation and are still “acceptable” 
performance, though no longer “ideal”. 
Detection of anomalies differs significantly than for failure and degradation, as degradation detection merely 
detects differences between expected and actual behavior. Expectations in turn can be based on prior analysis, or on 
prior operation. Without some data that defines expectations, no anomaly detection can occur. In general, one can 
say that anomaly detection is also based on goals, as anomaly detection picks up differences between “unexpected” 
performance of functions. Anomalies are defined as unexpected behaviors, which are unexpected values or patterns 
in state variables, which in turn when constrained are related to goals. While it is conceivable to find anomalies in 
state variables independently of goals, the only state variables worth checking for anomalies are those related to 
system goals. Thus in terms of coverage, it is probably best to start by determining how state variables in the system 
are related to goals, and to check for anomalies of state variables related to goals worthy of the effort. Thus coverage 
of anomaly detection is ideally based on a comparison of the total number of state variables that are associated with 
“sufficiently important” goals, and then determining if all of these are addressed by anomaly detection mechanisms. 
A nuance to this method is the assessment of whether the values of some not-directly-monitored state variables can 
or should be calculated based on other monitored state variables, and then checking for anomalies based on this 
calculated state instead of direct observation. 
For those anomalies, degradations, and failures that cannot be detected even in theory and hence are “not 
covered”, all non-covered behaviors are immediately removed from any calculations of the effectiveness of the 
relevant FMCLs. It is invalid to allocate failure to detect an anomaly, degradation, or failure to an FMCL if it is 
impossible even in theory for that FMCL to detect it. These “failures to detect” anomalies, degradations, or failures 
are charged against the system as a whole, but not to any individual FMCL. For example, if a particular failure mode 
is undetectable, but if it occurs it will cause loss of human life, then the system’s ability to protect against human life 
must be assessed as lower by the probability of the occurrence of the failure mode. This is more difficult to estimate 
probabilities in this way for anomalies, because the purpose of anomaly detection is to detect unexpected behaviors, 
including those not predicted in any prior analysis. 
B. Failure Detection Effectiveness 
Failure detection is the function of “deciding that a failure exists.” Since one way of defining failures is “the 
inability to achieve a system goal”, it is clear that when deciding if a failure exists, one must specify the goal that is 
to be achieved or the function that is to be performed. Then one must decide whether the behaviors being monitored 
indicate that the goal will be achieved. 
For all detected failure behaviors, one calculates the truth table metrics of TP/TN/FP/FN of the various detection 
mechanisms. Truth table metrics for detection all theoretically use probability distributions of successful and 
unsuccessful detections. The calculation of truth table probabilities must account for two major factors: the value of 
the detection threshold, and the probability of failure of the detection mechanisms. An example of the details for 
such calculations are described in Reference 5.5 
The first issue relates to the raw physics of the behaviors being monitored, and how the threshold that separates 
“failure” from “non-failure” is determined. Thresholds can be set closer to nominal behaviors, or further away. If set 
closer to nominal behaviors, then the probability of successfully detecting failure (TP) improves, but the possibility 
of incorrectly deciding a failure exists when it really does not (FP) also goes up. Conversely, if the threshold is set 
far from nominal behaviors, then the probability of TN goes up but FP goes down. However, the probability of not 
detecting the failure (FN) goes up. Estimation of these probabilities can be based on physics-based analysis prior to 
system operation, or from actual data from system operation. In practice on Space Launch System, we have found 
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that it is most crucial to calculate FP and FN, and then 1-FN = TP. TN does not generally appear in the calculations, 
though whether this is something specific to SLS or is a more general phenomenon is not clear. 
The second issue is the failure of the detection mechanism itself. The detection mechanism includes all 
components of the detection, whether the components are hardware, software, or human. The detection mechanism 
includes the sensing element, such as sensors, humans looking out windows, or software “observing” an internal 
variable, transport mechanisms for the sensed data, and the decision mechanisms, including software algorithms, 
thresholds, data qualification routines, or human decisions. Relevant failures thus include failure modes of hardware, 
software, or humans, with their associated probabilities. These can include failure of sensors, human error is a 
human is deciding whether a failure exists, an incorrectly loaded threshold value, software failure, and a host of 
other issues. 
Depending on the design of the detection mechanism, failures of the sensing components can produce various 
end-results in the overall detection, based on the architecture of how these components are connected, such as the 
levels and kinds of redundancy. The end results also depend on how the information from the detection mechanisms 
are combined and used, such as voting, averaging, and mechanisms to disqualify bad sensors or hardware. 
Within these scenarios, the FN probability appears as a “non-detection” of a system failure, and is hence a 
contingent probability. That is, you cannot have an FN unless a failure has occurred, so the probability is the 
probability of the failure times the probability of the failure to detect the failure. The TP probability is the amount of 
probability that is passed on for further analysis of the FMCL, while an FN is accounted for as a failure of the 
relevant function. 
By contrast, the FP probability shows up as a “cost” of the detection mechanism. Because every new mechanism 
put into the system has associated unreliability, this unreliability can and does cause problems that did not exist 
without that mechanism. In the case of failure detections, a FP tells the system that a failure exists in behaviors 
being monitored by the detection, when in fact the only failure is of the detection mechanism itself. This means that 
the system will take some response to a non-existent failure. Depending on what the responses are, this can mean 
loss of a mission, loss of redundancy or margins, loss of science data, and so on. Those would not have occurred 
except for the fact that the detection exists and that it has some inherent unreliability, which must be factored into 
any estimate of its value. This shows up in the failure scenarios as a new set of “false positive failure scenarios” that 
would not have existed if the FMCLs did not exist. So adding Fault Management adds new failure scenarios, which 
is to be expected because FM adds new mechanisms into the design that themselves can fail. 
Failure detection cannot be completely divorced from diagnostics of failures of the detection mechanisms. If 
Sensor Data Qualification (SDQ) is accounted for as part of the detection mechanism, the SDQ can remove from the 
failure detection any failed sensors, and thus increase the reliability of the detection and hence decrease the FP 
values for the detection. The effectiveness of SDQ is based on the ability to diagnose the fact of a sensor failure. The 
question is how one should account for this in the metrics. This entails a feedback loop from later parts of the FMCL 
back to the detection mechanism. This can be addressed in design-phase calculations, but is more difficult for a real-
time operational system, if such is desired or needed for the application. 
On SLS, SDQ is addressed as described in Reference 5.5 One of the things desired on SLS was to determine the 
“value” of SDQ, so what we did was to compare two detection mechanism designs, one with SDQ and one without, 
so as to determine how much benefit SDQ provided and hence to determine whether certain SDQ algorithms should 
be added or included in the abort trigger (failure detection) design. This was done successfully on SLS, and the team 
concluded that some of the SDQ algorithms have high value, while others have less. 
C. Degradation Detection Effectiveness 
Failure detection is the function of “deciding that a failure exists.” Since one way of defining failures is “the 
inability to achieve a system goal”, it is clear that when deciding if a failure exists, one must specify the goal that is 
to be achieved or the function that is to be performed. Then one must decide whether the behaviors being monitored 
indicate that the goal will be achieved. 
Degradation detection metrics, if needed, can be performed in the same way as failure detections, as these 
operate on the same state variables and in essence provide “early detection” of prospective failures. 
D. Anomaly Detection Effectiveness 
Anomaly degradation metrics differ from failure detection metrics in a manner similar to how anomalies differ 
from failures. While some anomalies occur due to failures, other anomalies are not failures at all, but are nonetheless 
unexpected and hence legitimate anomalies. One can argue that if known failure modes and effects create off-
nominal behaviors, that these are by definition not anomalous because they are known potential behaviors. From an 
analysis viewpoint, they exist in failure models of the system and are not really anomalous. If one occurs in 
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operations, it may be temporarily anomalous since failures sometimes occur randomly or “unexpectedly”. When the 
following investigation then determines that the behaviors are based on a known failure mode, the new behavior is 
no longer considered anomalous. Thus one can argue that to the extent anomaly detection is detecting known failure 
modes that can be pre-analyzed, it operates on the same set of failure modes as failure detection, but with a different 
mechanism to detect them and hence a different effectiveness. 
However, anomaly detection generally would not exist if all it did was detect known failure modes, because 
direct “failure detection” mechanisms are generally more effective in detecting known, pre-assessable failures. The 
primary purpose of anomaly detection is to detect non-predicted, unknown failures and failure modes (causes). By 
definition, this means that for its primary function, anomaly detection cannot be assessed against known failure 
modes. This poses difficulties for analysis. 
On what basis can anomaly detection be assessed for effectiveness? One possibility is to assess each anomaly 
detection based on what is “mathematically possible” as opposed to what is “physically possible”. An anomaly 
detection compares a set of expected behaviors (states over time) of a set of state variables to current operational 
values of that same set of state variables. To test this ahead of time, feed the anomaly detection the range of 
mathematically possible states (and over time, behaviors) and compare how well the anomaly detection picks up 
these ranges of data. Also, since particular state variables and their states are associated with specific system goals, it 
should be possible to associate anomalies related to those state variables to those goals to the exclusion of other 
goals. Thus it is possible to classify anomalies by association with relevant system goals, and therefore to analyze 
them in smaller, more easily assessable groupings than the entire set of state variables for the system. Not knowing 
the probabilities associated with the possible states, any anomaly detection effectiveness estimate must be based 
solely on the numbers of state variables and their mathematical ranges. 
E. Diagnostic Effectiveness 
The next functions in an FMCL are associated with diagnostics: isolating the location of the cause, and 
identifying the cause of the detected failure behaviors. Because diagnostics is a state estimation function, it too is 
estimated with truth/confusion table metrics of FP/FN and TP/TN. Fault isolation, which means determining the 
location of the cause of the detected failure behaviors, is generally assessed with respect to “ambiguity groups”, 
which define uncertainties in the possible location of the cause of a failure. 
We must translate ambiguity group metrics into FP/FN, and TP/TN probabilistic metrics. For fault isolation, in 
an ambiguity group of three, if all three locations are equally likely, then the probability of correct isolation on the 
first attempt is 33%. There may be physical or logical criteria that could change the likelihood of one or other of the 
components being the correct one. If one has to choose one and cannot choose others, then the probability of the 
correct choice, the True Positive, is only 33%. The probability of an incorrect choice can be considered a False 
Positive, which would then have a probability of 67%. On the other hand, if it is possible and acceptable to check all 
three locations, then the TP probability will be 100%, and the FP probability is 0%, if there are no failures of the 
fault isolation mechanisms themselves. It is also possible that the fault isolation routine may not identify any 
possible locations, when in fact there must be one or more. This would be a False Negative. In a crime investigation 
analogy, the police know there “is” a criminal, but have no idea where he might be, and thus cannot take any 
actions. In sum, to determine the proper truth table metrics, one must understand the operational use of the 
diagnostic information to translate from ambiguity group metrics to a FP/FN metrics for the FMCL. 
Similar logic applies to fault identification for identifying the correct failure modes. 
A fault isolation FP generally results in making the wrong decision about what response to take. Thus the correct 
response is not taken and the failure effects are not mitigated and continue to propagate. Just like a FP detection, the 
incorrect response and lack of correct response results in loss of redundancy, loss of mission, loss of science, or 
some other undesirable result. For fault identification, selecting the incorrect cause of the failure has costs in that the 
wrong responses will be taken. Since knowledge of the failure mode itself often results in changes to future plans for 
the system, how to repair a component, how to redesign a component so that failure mode becomes less likely, etc., 
this too has costs for the system.  
Fault isolation FN results generally mean that NO response action is taken, because there is no basis to decide 
what to do since the location of the cause cannot be identified. The failure effects propagate and nothing is done 
about it, which leads to the same bad results as if no FMCL existed. One might argue that if fault isolation cannot 
determine what to do, that it is possible for some systems it may be possible to take that system out of service to 
prevent an even worse effect. Thus with a nuclear power plant, if failure effects exist but the cause cannot be 
identified, one might shut down the power plant instead of assuming the risk of explosion. This is a valid point, and 
can be accounted for in the metric calculations as a case that leads to loss of service, though not a threat to life or 
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property. One must always determine the impact on system responses and goals, if any FM function fails. This 
impact can lead to variations in the way the overall FM calculations are performed. 
F. Prognostic Effectiveness 
Prognostics is another state estimation function, which uses “degradation detection” information as a basis to 
predict future behavior in a set of state variables, and in particular to predict when failure of a function will occur. 
Ideally prognosticating into the future requires a physics-based model, but when that is not available, sometimes a 
simple linear assumption is used to predict failure, in which case a data-driven approach can be used. A good 
overview of prognostics and associated metrics is described in Reference 6.6 
Prognostic experts generally agree that a primary output of prognostic funtions is the prediction of Remaining 
Useful Life (RUL), with appropriate uncertainty distributions to account for various factors that can influence the 
prediction. A component or system remains “useful” as long as it is performing the intended or needed function an 
an acceptable way. When the component is no longer performing acceptably, then it is considered “failed”, as per 
typical definitions of failure. This point in time is called the End of Life (EOL). RUL is an estimate of how much 
time is available for an action to be taken to mitigate the failure or reduce its effects. As such it is essentially an 
estimate of Time to Criticality (TTC). 
Other supporting or related prognostic metrics are related to the quality of this estimate. Some classify these 
related metrics into estimates of accuracy, precision, and convergence. Accuracy refers to the “degree of closeness 
of a predictive estimate to its actual value.” Precision relates to the variability of predictions. Convergence refers to 
the degree of improvement in the estimate over time, as EOL approaches. 
From the standpoint of Fault Management theory, prognostics is simply another technique of performing state 
estimates, with the difference that it is an estimate of a future state, as opposed to a past or current state. That being 
the case, like any other state estimate, it needs to be converted into truth table metrics of False Positive and False 
Negative. However, prognostics also adds an additional element, which is that its estimate of RUL inherently relates 
to the required time in which the overall FMCL must operate, which is the TTC. 
To date, the specific methods by which RUL, accuracy, precision, and convergence metrics can be converted to 
FP/FN and TTC have not been developed in detail. However, some directions for how this can be done are apparent. 
First, the RUL estimate itself is a TTC estimate, and can be used as such and compared with the overall time of 
FMCL execution to impact the FMCL effectiveness metric as described below. An RUL estimate that is too 
conservative predicts EOL at an earlier point in time than the “actual” EOL time. In terms of the overall FMCL and 
system impact, this leads to a system response taken when not (yet) needed, which acts much like an FP. Every FP 
leads to an unnecessary response. In this case, the response might eventually be necessary, but if taken early, it will 
lead to added system costs if a component is replaced too early, or if the system is taken out of service when it did 
not need to be. Conversely, an RUL that is too optimistic is much like an FN, in that the system could fail before the 
appropriate failure mitigation is taken. In this case, the full consequence of the failure is suffered, which occurs as if 
the prognostic did not exist. If there are no other FMCLs to address the consequences of the failure, then system 
failure ensues. If other FMCLs exist to address failure of the component, then the FN of the prognostic will lead to 
execution of the real-time FMCL, with its corresponding effectiveness. Presumably the prognostic FMCL would not 
exist unless the resulting failure leads to some negative consequence that cannot be adequately addressed by a real-
time FMCL (classical FDIR). 
G. Response-Action Determination Effectiveness 
Once state estimation functions are complete, a decision must be made about what to do. To our knowledge, 
there is no “theory” about what metric to apply to this, but clearly the metric must ultimately relate to whether the 
correct response is selected, given a valid set of state estimation information upon which to make the decision. 
Obviously, if the state estimates are wrong, then the response is also likely to be incorrect, but this would be 
attributed to the state estimation functions, not the decision function. So the decision metric is one that specifies the 
probability of correct or incorrect decision about what action to take. This is less complex if a predetermined set of 
actions are available, but far more complex if those are not known ahead of time. If the wrong response is selected, 
then it will not just be ineffective, but it will likely cause loss of other system resources related to that response 
(such as removing a redundant component from use, even if that component is functioning properly), while the 
failure continues to propagate to its ultimate bad effect. 
H. Response Effectiveness 
The last major metric for FM is the effectiveness of the failure response. This metric applies only if the prior 
state estimations identified the correct system state, and the decision function has selected the correct response. 
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Response effectiveness, like all other FM metrics, is a probabilistic quantity regarding the likelihood that the 
response will mitigate the failure effects that it is intended to address in a specific failure scenario. Since the entire 
FMCL is intended to preserve some goal, the effectiveness of the response is calculated with respect to that goal. For 
example, if the goal is to maximize the acquisition of science data (or minimize loss of science data), then response 
effectiveness is measured by how much science data is acquired, or conversely, how much is lost. 
Calculating response effectiveness is generally grounded in physics-based or logic-based analysis. Time plays a 
major role in response effectiveness. This is because the success of the mitigation is largely based on the result of a 
race condition of the failure effects versus the failure response. That is, failure effects take time to propagate from 
cause to the compromise of the relevant goal. The failure response is generally effective if it performs its function 
before the failure effect compromises the goal, and conversely is ineffective if it does not. For the FMCL of which 
the response is a part, the time to be assessed includes the entire set of detections, diagnostics, decision, and 
response, not just of the response by itself. The end result is an estimate of the probability that the response 
completes before the failure effect compromises the goal. 
I. FMCL Effectiveness 
Ultimately, what is needed is the ultimate metric that the FMCL as a whole successfully mitigates the failure in 
the given failure scenario, and then summing across all failure scenarios, provide a measure of the effectiveness of 
all FMCLs across all probability-weighted failure scenarios. 
For any given failure scenario, the response effectiveness probability by itself is not the final result, because 
failure of the detections, diagnostics, or decisions also lead to the failure of the FMCL. In addition, the False 
Positives of the state estimates, or incorrect response decisions also create additional costs beyond simply failing to 
mitigate the relevant failure. All of these must be factored into the FMCL effectiveness estimate. In essence, all FN 
state estimates lead to the failure effect not being mitigated. All FP state estimates result in additional costs, because 
it activates a response action when one was not needed and hence generate new failure scenarios that did not exist 
before the implementation of the FMCL. Incorrect response decisions, like FP state estimates, create added cost, but 
they also mean that the ongoing failure is not mitigated. All of these factor into the final estimate of the effectiveness 
of the FMCL. The benefit of the FMCL in preserving the goal is when all FM functions work properly. 
An effective FMCL design has a significant probabilistic benefit. Compared to its benefits, failures of the should 
be FMCL much less likely, and for FNs and incorrect response decisions, only occur if a failure occurs to begin 
with. FP detections, isolations, and identifications yield entirely new failures whose costs must be subtracted from 
the FMCL benefits. Incorrect response decisions create new costs and also yield no failure mitigation benefits. 
A final issue to be considered is that for each scenario, more than one FMCL may be invoked. On SLS for 
aborts, it only matters which FMCL is activated first, because the response is always the same:  abort. Once an abort 
is activated, it does not matter if another attempt to activate occurs, because the first one will execute and only one 
abort response can ever happen. For other systems, there can and will be other kinds of responses that can occur. If 
more than one FMCL is activated in a scenario, then the metrics captured must address this. 
As an example, assume a spacecraft application, in which an actuator fails to function. The failure could be in 
the actuator, or it could be in the control electronics transmitting data between the flight computers and the 
actuators, or it could be the computer itself. Assume all are redundant, and all are cross strapped. One way in which 
FM could operate would be to detect the failure and then swap to redundant actuators, and then wait to see if 
actuation occurs. Assume this fails. The FM next switches to the redundant control electronics and then waits to see 
if actuation ensues. This fails, so the FM now switches flight computers, and finally this works. In this design, is the 
FM effective because ultimately it fixed the problem? If so, then the FM metrics must account for the serial nature 
of the responses, which operate in this case much like repair and maintenance procedures. We have described this 
situation before when discussing the computation of diagnostics. In essence we have on-board algorithms doing 
diagnostic repair procedures much as their human counterparts might do for another system. Presumably the 
calculation would need to be performed in a similar way, assuming that all three actions must be accounted for, and 
if any of them succeeds that the FM has worked correctly. Failure of the FMCL in this case would only occur if 
none of these actions succeed prior to system failure. That is, actuation is needed to achieve a goal, and if the goal is 
not achieved, the failure ensues. 
V. Example Calculations 
In this section, we will provide an example of FM metrics calculation. For the purposes of this paper, we do not 
intend to address all of the complexities involved with full probabilistic representations, distributions, and methods. 
That is not because this is unimportant, but rather that our purpose here is to show the basics of the individual metric 
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calculations, and how they are combined to provide estimates of the effectiveness of FMCLs, and for all FMCLs in a 
system as an estimate of the effectiveness of FM as a whole for a system. Attempting to describe the full statistical 
detail would tend to obscure what we are trying to show. However, given that all of these methods are ultimately 
related to the statistical benefits and risks of FM for a system to protect system goals, probabilistic methods are 
inherent and required. The level of sophistication needed will depend on the level and cost of risks associated with a 
given system, and the resources available to assess such risks. 
For our example calculation, we shall assume a planetary probe application in which providing science data back 
to Earth is the system goal. As FM exists to protect this goal, that means that once in space, the benefit of FM is 
measured against potential losses of science data. For other systems of course this can vary from protection of 
human life, protection of profits, or other goals as appropriate. 
Our example space probe goes to a planet farther away from the Sun than Earth, such as Mars or Jupiter, and will 
use solar panels and batteries for power generation. It has typical subsystems that provide normal spacecraft support 
functions: the electrical power system provides and distrubutes electrical power, the thermal protection system keeps 
temperature ranges within appropriate bounds, the science subsystems gather science data, the command and data 
handling system manages the mission and stores the data, the attitude control system points the spacecraft and 
science instruments, and the propulsion system provides thrust needed to keep attitude control and put the spacecraft 
on the proper trajectory. We will assume two science instruments that require precision pointing (such as cameras), 
and one science instrument that does not require pointing control (such as magnetometers). The Fault Management 
exists to protect all of these system functions, insofar as they are related to the ultimate system goal of gathering and 
transmitting science data to Earth. 
As will be discussed below, it will be necessary to define some initial candidate FM capabilities that will be 
designed into the system, as the metrics will evaluate the effectiveness of those proposed designs. For our planetary 
probe, we will assume a dual-string design for most of the propulsion capabilities and other mechanical and moving 
parts, and also a centralized duplex computer system operating on a hot-warm basis (one being prime, another 
backup) with bus cross-strapping between the triplex and duplex components. If it is desired to evaluate different 
design options such as a triplex or quad computer system architecture or non-cross-strapped operations, or different 
variations of these, then the calculations described below can be performed for each alternative design that is being 
assessed. 
A. Failure Scenarios and FMCLs to be Assessed 
The first task is to define failure scenarios for the system. It is desirable to define all “credible” scenarios for the 
system, for which credibility is a probabilistic risk threshold value against which all possible scenarios are judged. 
Barring this, then a single failure tolerance criteria or some other relevant criteria can be used to define scenarios. A 
major factor in defining failure scenarios is variation in failure effects based on changes in system configuration or 
environment. Another key factor is to define scenarios to the level of granularity required to assess the performance 
of the potential FMCLs that could be designed into the system. For example, if there are three different detections 
and 2 different responses, which can execute in any combination, then at least 6 scenarios at the relevant level are 
likely needed to differentiate the performance of each of these potential combinations. It is thus necessary to have 
some initial idea of the FM designs that are to be assessed. 
At a high level, failure scenarios relate to losses of function that can occur at different phases of the mission, and 
the differing failure effects and timing that are relevant in these phases. For example during science data gathering 
phases, loss of ability to point the science instruments is critical as it causes loss of science data immediately. 
However, a loss of attitude control during the cruise phase on the way to the planet causes little or no loss of science 
data of the target planet, as long as it is fixed prior to orbit insertion or flyby, or any other science data gathering. In 
general, electrical failures cause system failure within milliseconds, whereas thermal protection failures could take 
hours, days, or weeks. The TTCs associated with these scenarios vary accordingly. We will look at a few cases of 
specific FMCLs and how their effectiveness is estimated using the metrics described above. We will not attempt to 
define a global set of scenarios for our example space probe, but will pick out a few relevant cases to illustrate the 
calculation methods. 
The example scenarios that will be used in our example calculations will be as follows: 
1) Global loss of computing function during cruise phase (GLC-C) 
2) Global loss of computing function during orbit insertion (GLC-O) 
3) Global loss of computing function during science-gathering phase (GLC-S) 
4) Loss of thermal control during cruise phase (LTC-C) 
5) Loss of thermal control during science-gathering phase (LTC-S) 
6) Loss of attitude control during cruise phase (LAC-C) 
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7) Loss of attitude control during orbit insertion (LAC-O) 
8) Loss of attitude control during science-gathering phase (LAC-S) 
9) Propellant leaks during cruise phase (PRP-C) 
10) Propellant leaks during science-gathering phase (PRP-S) 
There will be several or many causes that can create the conditions described in this list. For the loss of 
computing function, assume that a watchdog timer or some other non-computer mechanism exists to reboot the 
computers. Failures could be of hardware or software. Note that two scenarios, thruster leaks and loss of thermal 
control during orbit insertion (THR-O and LTC-O) have been removed from consideration. In our example, we have 
made preliminary determination that these scenarios are not credible during those particular phases, meaning that 
they are either improbable, or do not create mission-threatening effects during these time periods. 
The probability of these scenarios are assumed estimated using standard reliability techniques from historical 
data and reliability handbook data, and are represented in convenient table form. Note that there are uncertainties 
and distributions for these values, but for simplicity of explanation of the methods, we will ignore them. 
 
Table 1. Example Failure Scenarios and Estimated Risk Values 
 Cruise (C) Orbit Insertion (O) Science Gathering (S) 
Loss Computing (GLC) 1E-4 1E-5 3E-4 
Loss of Thermal (LTC) 1E-5 Not Credible 2E-5 
Loss of Att Ctl (LAC) 2E-4 3E-4 5E-4 
Propellant Leak (PRP) 3E-4 Not Credible 4E-4 
Total Risk in these scenarios: 2.14E-3. 
 
The FMCLs to be assessed against these scenarios are as follows: 
1) Watchdog Timeout; Computer Reboot and Safing (WT-Rbt&Sf) 
2) Mission Operations Thermal Trending; Attitude Profile Redesign and Power On Extra Components (Trnd-
Att&PWR) 
3) Atttitude Control Failure Detection; Sequenced Switch to Redundant Strings of Sensors, Data Buses, and 
Computers, and Shut Thruster Valves and Switch to Redundant Thrusters (not necessarily in that order) 
(ACFD-ACRED) 
4) Excessive Imbalanced Thruster Commanding; Shut Thruster Valves and Switch to Redundant Thrusters, 
Sequenced Switch to Redundant Strings of Sensors, Data Buses, and Computers (not necessarily in that 
order, though thruster valve closures and switches would likely be the first action) (TCMD-THREDSW) 
The FMCL definitions define the proposed detection, and after the semicolon the proposed response. In our 
FMCL design, we do not allow responses to execute in parallel, so as to avoid potential response conflicts and 
overly complex detection-response interactions. This rule is violated during orbit insertion, when any possible 
responses must be executed immediately and in parallel as the time constraints are critical. This means greater risks  
of the responses interacting in dangerous ways, but given that the maneuver must succeed and all possible actions to 
ensure success must be taken, this risk is acceptable. Also, note that failure detections, prognostics, and responses 
can be on board and/or on the ground. Thus the safing response after computer reboot will also include ground 
intervention to get the mission going again after the spacecraft goes into safing mode and attempts to contact Earth. 
B. Detection Coverage 
The first major metric required is failure detection is coverage. A detection mechanism can be assessed for 
effectiveness only against those failures, degradations, or anomalies that it theoretically capable of detecting. If it 
cannot detect these behaviors, even in theory, then the detection has no “coverage” of those behaviors. Conversely, 
if behaviors are potentially detectable by the detection mechanism, then the mechanism “covers” them. For purposes 
of our calculations, prognostic predictions act as failure detection mechanisms and are treated as such. 
Note that not all failures are detectable even “in theory”. For loss of computer function, it could be that a total 
loss of power is the cause, in which case the watchdog timer will be irrelevant. One can imagine propellant leaks in 
the near the tanks that produce little or no rotational thrust and hence not detectable through attitude control or 
excessive thruster command imbalance detections. Presumably these could be detected through another mechanism 
such as loss of pressure in the propellant tanks, but for we are not assuming the existence of that kind of detection. 
Thus some small fraction of propellant leak failures will lead directly to loss of mission. During cruise this would 
mean no science is gathered. In the science-gathering phase, some science might have been gathered prior to 
occurrence of the failure. 
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In general, loss of science numbers during science gathering are accumulated at 50%, under the assumption that 
science gathering is a linear function of time, and the probability of failure is constant throughout the science 
gathering phase. Conversely, non-detected failures during cruise or orbit insertion would result in 0% science 
gathered, or 100% of the non-detected risk accruing to a loss of mission (LOM) risk. The “50%” accumulation 
during science phases is accounted for here under detection coverage in that an additional 50% of coverage beyond 
the initial coverage estimate is provided. Thus the original estimate of 99% coverage for the Watchdog Timer is 
improved to 99.5% for the science-gathering phase, and the original 70% estimate for the thruster command 
imbalance detection is increased to 75%, under the assumption that all non-covered risk (10% of the total scenario 
risk) is accrued to this detection instead of attitude control. This will have the effect of decreasing the loss of science 
in the science-gathering phase by 50% in these failure scenarios. 
In our scenarios, the thermal trending prognostics and watchdog timers exclusively detect their respective 
scenarios, but for attitude control and leak cases, the two detection mechanisms of commanded thruster imbalance 
and attitude control loss can potentially detect loss of attitude control cases and thruster leak cases. After assessment 
of the failure effect propagations and the detection and prognostic mechanisms, we get the following coverage 
estimates and resulting “covered risk” and “non-covered risk” that leads to Loss of Mission because no detection can 
pick up the failure.  
 
Table 2. Detection Coverage of Failure Scenarios 
 WT-RbtSf Trnd-Att&Pwr ACFD-ACRed TCMD-THRed 
GLC-C 99%    
GLC-O 99%    
GLC-S 99.5%    
LTC-C  100%   
LTC-S  100%   
LAC-C   90% 10% 
LAC-O   100%  
LAC-S   90% 10% 
PRP-C   20% 70% 
PRP-S   20% 75% 
 
The next table takes the original scenario risk value, multiplies by the coverage fractions, and generates the 
amount of risk picked up by each detection. Any residual non-detected risk is assigned a loss of science (that is, loss 
of mission-LOM) number, depending on when it occurred.  
 
Table 3: Risk Coverage and non-Covered Risk Absolute Values 
 Scenario Risk WT-RbtSf Trnd-
Att&Pwr 
ACFD-
ACRed 
TCMD-
THRed 
Non-Covered 
LOM Risk 
GLC-C 1E-4 9.9E-5    1E-6 
GLC-O 1E-5 9.9E-6    1E-7 
GLC-S 3E-4 2.985E-4    1.5E-6 
LTC-C 1E-5  1E-5   0 
LTC-S 2E-5  2E-5   0 
LAC-C 2E-4   1.8E-4 2E-5 0 
LAC-O 3E-4   3E-4  0 
LAC-S 5E-4   4.5E-4 5E-5 0 
PRP-C 3E-4   6E-5 2.1E-4 3E-5 
PRP-S 4E-4   8E-5 3E-4 2E-5 
 
C. Detection Effectiveness 
In theory, even if a detection mechanism should be able to detect the relevant failure behaviors, imperfections in 
the detection mechanism and inherent tradeoffs in the ability to detect failure behavior from nominal behavior 
means that their effectiveness is always less than 100%. For detections that detect binary signals, the issues of 
setting thresholds to separate nominal from failed behaviors do not exist, so for these, there is one less source of 
errors than for detections that require the use of thresholds. 
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For our example detections, not all of them are effective equally at all times during the mission. The watchdog 
timer is not as effective during orbit insertion, because it is based on two means to reset the timer. The first is an 
occasional reset from the ground, and the other is an occasional reset by the flight software. The ground resets are 
not relevant during the short period of orbit insertions, so failures of the computing system during that time period 
that cause loss of most computer functions but nonetheless reset the watchdog timer will probably lead to loss of 
mission. Propellant leak detections are very effective in cruise, but not as effective during science-gathering, 
because the spacecraft maneuvers a lot during science gathering, which means that the threshold of thrust command 
imbalance cannot be set as tightly. More leaks will go undetected for too long. Mission operations trend analysis is 
assumed to be 100% effective, as there is generally plenty of time to detect a slow-acting thermal issue. 
As described in the previous section regarding coverage, the effect of detection failure accrues to loss of science 
at only a 50% rate compared to the same failure occurring during orbit insertion or cruise phases. During these 
phases if the failures occur and the system is lost, no science will be gathered. The reduced effect of failures during 
the science-gathering phase for these cases are accounted for by increases in detection effectiveness for cruise 
phases for attitude control and propellant leak scenarios. 
 
Table 4. Detection Effectiveness per Failure Scenario 
 WT-RbtSf Trnd-Att&Pwr ACFD-ACRed TCMD-THRed 
GLC-C 99.9%    
GLC-O 95%    
GLC-S 99.9%    
LTC-C  100%   
LTC-S  100%   
LAC-C   99% 99% 
LAC-O   98%  
LAC-S   99.5% 97.5% 
PRP-C   99% 99% 
PRP-S   99.5% 97.5% 
 
Applying these values to the residual risk numbers from the coverage estimates, we get the following absolute 
residuals of detected and non-detected risk values. Note that non-detected cumulative risk adds new detection 
effectiveness risks to prior coverage risks. Also, for scenarios in which more than one detection picks up risk in the 
scenario, non-detected risks accumulate from both detections. 
 
Table 5. Detection Effectiveness Cumulative Risks per Failure Scenario 
 WT-RbtSf Trnd-Att&Pwr ACFD-ACRed TCMD-THRed Cumulative LOM Risk 
GLC-C 9.89E-5    1.099E-6 
GLC-O 9.405 E-6    5.95E-7 
GLC-S 2.984E-4    1.649E-6 
LTC-C  1E-5   0 
LTC-S  2E-5   0 
LAC-C   1.782E-4 1.98E-5 2E-6 
LAC-O   2.94E-4  6E-6 
LAC-S   4.478E-4 4.875E-5 3.5E-6 
PRP-C   5.94E-5 2.079E-4 3.27E-5 
PRP-S   7.96E-5 2.925E-4 2.79E-5 
 
D. Fault Isolation Effectiveness 
Once detected, the location of the cause of the failure effects must be determined, so that the proper response can 
be determined and executed. For slow-acting thermal problems, there is plenty of time to determine the likely 
location and the areas affected by it. For loss of computing, there is no other location that can cause the inability for 
the watchdog timer to be reset, except for the computer or the timer itself for which the risk is negligible. Problems 
with attitude control must be associated with the components in the control loop, with the possible exception of a 
debris strike. As long as the responses executed switch all possible components in the loop, these are addressed, 
unless it is a common-cause software problem, in which case a computer reboot may be needed. As long as this is in 
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the response chain, then all possibilities have been addressed. A propellant leak is the most difficult failure to isolate 
properly. 
In our example calculation, the only cases for which isolation effectiveness will be less than 100% are for loss of 
control and propellant leak cases during science mission phases. For these cases, we will assume that these would 
lead to minor losses of science of about 1% during the mission due to this cause, or 99% effective. Thus all of the 
data remains the same from Table 5 above, except for the LAC-S and PRP-S scenarios. The 50% reduction factor 
does not apply in this case for the science-gathering phase, as the issue is not loss of the entire mission after the 
failure, but rather losses of science during the fault management actions, followed by the mission being re-started. 
 
Table 6. Isolation Effectiveness Cumulative Risks per Failure Scenario 
 WT-RbtSf Trnd-Att&Pwr ACFD-ACRed TCMD-THRed Non-Detected 
Cumulative Risk 
GLC-C 9.89E-5    1.099E-6 
GLC-O 9.405E-6    5.95E-7 
GLC-S 2.984E-4    1.649E-6 
LTC-C  1E-5   0 
LTC-S  2E-5   0 
LAC-C   1.782E-4 1.98E-5 2E-6 
LAC-O   2.94E-4  6E-6 
LAC-S   4.433E-4 4.826E-5 8.465E-6 
PRP-C   5.94E-5 2.079E-4 3.27E-5 
PRP-S   7.88E-5 2.89E-4 3.162E-5 
 
E. Failure Response Decision Effectiveness 
Deciding what response should be taken is generally a pre-determined activity for on-board responses, but not 
always for ground-based decisions. As described above, the on-board responses are generally pre-planned sequences 
of actions that account for all possible responses that could lead to the failure effects being observed. As long as they 
are all used as planned, the response decision effectiveness should be 100%. It would be less than 100% if for some 
reason the wrong responses were executed. This would most likely be a software or parameter load problem with a 
very small likelihood. Ground-based decisions are not always pre-planned and pre-analyzed in this manner. For 
example, slow-acting thermal problems would not be expected to occur, but there are a number of real-life examples 
in which this has occurred. Deciding the best response to take is not always simple, and could in fact be found 
inadequate when executed. 
For our purposes here, the lack of a proper on-board response will be addressed under response decision 
effectiveness, using the reasoning that sometimes an effective a response could in theory have been put in place. It 
will apply to the ground-based thermal failure responses during the science mission phase. Here we will postulate 
that a response that changes the mission profile and configuration to yield better thermal control do not work as well 
as expected, and another response is selected instead, but only after some science data is compromised. 
We will assume a 1% loss of science data could occur for thermal problems due to improper responses taken by 
mission operations during science-gathering phase only. This yields the following residual risks. 
 
Table 7. Response Decision Effectiveness Cumulative Risks per Failure Scenario 
 WT-RbtSf Trnd-Att&Pwr ACFD-ACRed TCMD-THRed Cumulative 
LOM Risk 
GLC-C 9.89E-5    1.099E-6 
GLC-O 9.405E-6    5.95E-7 
GLC-S 2.984E-4    1.649E-6 
LTC-C  1E-5   0 
LTC-S  1.98E-5   2E-7 
LAC-C   1.782E-4 1.98E-5 2E-6 
LAC-O   2.94E-4  6E-6 
LAC-S   4.433E-4 4.826E-5 8.465E-6 
PRP-C   5.94E-5 2.079E-4 3.27E-5 
PRP-S   7.88E-5 2.896E-4 3.162E-5 
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F. Failure Response Effectiveness 
The last metric for the FMCLs is failure response effectiveness. Like the prior metrics, there is a response 
effectiveness fraction for each FMCL in each scenario, which is multiplied by the cumulative reduced risk fraction 
from prior steps, in this case the cumulative risk from the failure response decision function. Any portion of that risk 
for which the response is not effective is added to the cumulative LOM risk. Thus if a response is 90% effective, 
90% of the risk resulting from prior steps leads to a successful response, and hence to a successful outcome for the 
FMCL as a whole. The 10% that is not effective accumulates to the cumulative LOM risk for that scenario. 
Failure response effectiveness is the portion of the calculation in which the overall FMCL latency is addressed. 
That is, the time it takes to execute the FMCL is compared to the Time to Criticality associated with the failure 
effects in the scenario. If the TTC time expires before the FMCL completes, then the response is not effective. 
Otherwise, the response generally is effective. As the TTC and the FMCL latency are both probabilistic predictions 
of their respective times, this leads to a probabilistic effectiveness criteria. Other factors can also play a part in the 
estimate of response effectiveness, such as variations in the criticality of the failure effects, and not just in the timing 
of those failure effects. We will not attempt to address all of these possibilities here in this paper, but suffice it to say 
that like all other calculations described, physical and probabilistic factors must be addressed to perform these 
estimates, which vary based on the application. 
For our example case, prognostics and ground response to thermal failure is generally performed well in advance 
of the TTC, but the nature of the response could be such that one inherently compromises some of the mission data 
gathering. This can occur if one must keep the spacecraft at specific atttitudes to keep certain parts in view of the 
Sun’s rays, and keeping other parts shaded. This could take away from times in which it would otherwise be 
desirable to point the science instruments. This contributes to a prediction of less than 100% effectiveness of 
responses during the science gathering phase of the mission. 
Responses to computer problems result in computer reboot and safing will cause loss of science data during 
science-gathering. A loss of computer function during orbit insertion causes loss of mission every time as a reboot 
response will cause loss of control due to the length of time required for a reboot compared to the timing of a loss of 
control during this time period, leading to the orbit insertion not occurring. Loss of attitude control can cause loss of 
science data during science gathering as the instruments would not be pointed at their targets for some period of 
time, thought most likely this would be for smaller time periods than if a computer reboot and safing were required. 
Propellant loss cases would be less likely to cause loss of science, except insofar as loss of propellant shortens the 
mission. The following table shows the estimates of response effectiveness for our example case. 
 
Table 8. Response Effectiveness per FMCL per Failure Scenario 
 WT-RbtSf Trnd-Att&Pwr ACFD-ACRed TCMD-THRed 
GLC-C 95%    
GLC-O 0%    
GLC-S 92%    
LTC-C  96%   
LTC-S  98%   
LAC-C   100% 98% 
LAC-O   90%  
LAC-S   99% 95% 
PRP-C   98% 98% 
PRP-S   98% 95% 
 
As with previous FMCL functions, the response effectiveness numbers are multiplied by the risk residuals from 
the prior table for response decision effectiveness to yield the total FMCL effectiveness and total cumulative LOM 
risk per scenario in the table below. 
 
Table 9. FMCL Cumulative Risks per Failure Scenario 
 WT-RbtSf Trnd-Att&Pwr ACFD-ACRed TCMD-THRed Cumulative 
LOM Risk 
GLC-C 9.396E-5    6.044E-6 
GLC-O 0    1E-5 
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GLC-S 2.745E-4    2.522E-5 
LTC-C  9.6E-6   4E-7 
LTC-S  1.94E-5   5.96E-7 
LAC-C   1.782E-4 1.94E-5 2.396E-6 
LAC-O   2.646E-4  3.54E-5 
LAC-S   4.388E-4 4.585E-5 1.531E-5 
PRP-C   5.821E-5 2.037E-4 3.805E-5 
PRP-S   7.723E-5 2.751E-4 4.768E-5 
 
G. Value of FMCLs 
The value of the FMCLs per scenario can now be gathered up to estimate the value of the FMCLs across the 
scenarios, which is to say the value that each FMCL provides for the system in terms of protecting the mission, 
which in this case means protection of science return. One simply adds up the risk that is mitigated by each FMCL 
from all scenarios in which the FMCL applies. After removing the amount of risk in each scenario that is not 
covered, that is to say not detectable even in theory, one can divide the total risk mitigated by the FMCL by the 
amount of covered risk in the scenario by the FMCL to get the effectiveness fraction or percentage of the FMCL. 
The non-covered fraction should be reported separately as “non-covered risk” that creates loss of mission / loss of 
science. If it is desired to protect against that non-covered risk, then some other mechanism must be provided, either 
FM to predict or detect and respond, or to prevent the failure from occurring by adding design margin (which is the 
other major aspect of SHM), which would directly lower the probability of occurrence.7 
This yields the following value estimates of the FMCLs in terms of loss of science / loss of mission. The positive 
way of stating the value is “Loss of Science Benefit”, or “Loss of Mission Benefit”. 
 
Table 10. FMCL Value Estimates 
FMCL Name Original Risk Non-Covered 
Risk 
Covered Risk LOS/LOM 
Benefit 
Effectiveness 
Fraction 
WT-RbtSf 4.10E-4 2.60E-6 4.07E-4 3.68E-4 90.4% 
Trnd-Att&Pwr 3.00E-5 0 3.00E-5 2.90E-5 96.7% 
ACFD-ACRed 1.07E-3 0 1.07E-3 1.02E-3 95.1% 
TCMD-THRed 6.30E-4 5.00E-5 5.80E-4 5.44E-4 93.8% 
 
For our example case, we see that the most effective FMCL is Thermal Trending with Attitude-Power response. 
However, it is the lowest value (lowest LOS/LOM Benefit) FMCL because the probability of thermal problems is 
low. However, because this is done on the ground, it is likely low cost compared to on-board options and thus 
probably worthwhile. Others are less effective against the failures they address, but are nonetheless high overall 
value because the probability of failure scenarios that these address is high. FM designers can use metrics like this to 
determine whether the value of the FMCLs are worth their cost in terms of hardware redundancy, algorithms, 
testing, and so on. For example, going from a relatively ineffective dual computer architecture to a much more 
effective triplex would definitely decrease system risks, but would require additional mass, power, and cost for the 
third computer. 
FM metrics like this, and the design considerations addressed in calculating them and using the results to aid in 
design decisions, have been used and demonstrated successfully on the NASA Space Launch System program. On 
SLS, the application was the selection of algorithms to detect abort conditions, which are crew-threatening failures 
and from which the crew needs to escape and return to Earth using launch and on-orbit abort systems.8 
VI. Conclusion 
Fault Management theory is based on the idea that Fault Management operates as a suite of meta-control loops 
(FMCLs) that predict, detect and respond to existing or prospective failures, and keep or return the system to a 
controllable state. The purpose of these control loops is to provide insurance and assurance that the system will 
achieve its goals. Whether these FMCLs are worth the cost and complexity of adding them into the design is a 
design trade like any other. As with most other engineering trades, quantification is a great help in determining if the 
design is technically effective, and cost effective. 
Control theory suggests the use of metrics based on state estimation and state control. State estimation refers to 
the knowledge of system health, and state control refers to the control of the system to maintain health or mitigate 
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failure effects to achieve as many of the system’s goals as possible. Control of system health will not be effective 
unless the system’s health is properly estimated. State estimation metrics are based on True Positive / True Negative 
/ False Positive / False Negative measures. State control metrics are based on decision and control effectiveness, 
which for the latter are largely dependent on the timing race condition between failure effect propagation and the 
latency of FMCL execution. 
This paper describes the theoretical issues that must be considered, and provides an example calculation to 
demonstrate how to use these metrics to determine the value of Fault Management Control Loops. This in turn can 
be used to assess trade studies on different FM designs, and in the latter part of the design and build process to help 
verify and validate that design to determine if system dependability goals are being met. That this can be done is 
demonstrated by its successful use in NASA’s human-rated Space Launch System for assessment of abort detection 
and response. 
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